The Arab-Israeli conflict has taught me that there are three essential ways to do battle.
First, be nice. Being nice worked fairly well at certain points in this seemingly interminable situation. It worked well with Egypt in 1979 (though not so well for Sadat). Egypt was returned the Sinai Peninsula in exchange for a long-lasting "cold peace." It worked well with Jordan, whose leaders and civil society are perhaps some of the most moderate and well-meaning in the region. It seemed to be working for a few years after the Oslo Accords, but with enough bad-faith actions on both sides, nice gave way to other, more powerful emotions.
With some exceptions, nice didn't work terribly well in Israel's dealings with Palestinians. Yassir Arafat was hardly ever serious about cutting a real deal with Israel. He rejected a pretty generous offer by Ehud Barak in the late 90s, and never really did anything to rein in Hamas beyond where it fit internal necessities of keeping his own Fatah folk busy and receiving money exclusively from his pockets. Revolutionaries are good at shaking things up, but almost never make good leaders during the boring discussions on how things are actually going to work. I prefer former generals. They are a rule-abiding, honorable and pragmatic bunch.
Second, be ruthless and uncompromising. Prior to any situation where being nice was a possibility, this option was very successful in 1, establishing a Jewish State through a series of terrorist acts and full-scale military operations, 2, repelling three heavily armed nations in '67, and 3, repelling them again in '73. Oh, and occupying all that land with religious and nationalistic zealots was a good way to seal the deal.
It didn't work very well with Lebanon or Syria, who are still bitter over a protracted occupation by Israeli forces, and their indirect responsibility for massacres in Beirut in the early eighties. The occupation of the Golan Heights is also a sore subject, though perhaps a strategic necessity since, being a "heights", it is the ideal place to lob shells into the Israeli heartland it overlooks.
Third, ignore the other side and act on your own. This is the latest answer to Arab-Israeli conflict. Strategy Three is the exclusive province of Israeli strategy, since the other side either already has "nice" deals with them, or has felt the wrath of "ruthless and uncompromising," got nothing for it, and is now hesitant to open up a new battlefront. When nice and mean don't work so well, disengagement is a sensible option. As an elected official, nobody gets to call you "too nice" or "too mean", and as a strategy, it allows its follower to seek its own objectives without the trouble of negotiation, or its clearly horrific alternatives.
If the disengaging party's terms are unacceptable, there is only one thing that the opponent can do in response to Strategy Three. Force their adversary to engage. Abduct their soldiers on patrol and demand negotiations for prisoner swaps, land, whatever. Instigate armed conflict by launching Qazzam rockets from Gaza and Lebanon. At any cost, do not let them ignore you, do not let them build a wall around their subdivisions on seized land in the West Bank. Don't let them cut their own deal.
Analysis. While Hamas and Hisbullah made overtures towards Strategy One (being nice), abducting soldiers, and launching missiles onto enemy cities is textbook Strategy Two (being mean). Of course, this is because Strategy One is useless against Strategy Three (plug ears and go la la la la la). We've seen in the past week how this response to Israeli disengagement has led to Israel's own reversion to Strategy Two. Israel is on the verge of a military intervention on its northern and southern borders on a scale unseen for at least 20 years. They've already run an airstrike on Beirut's airport. This is a really, really bad situation. It's likely to get worse before it gets better.
Strategy One is the weakest and most difficult of the three. In some situations, i.e, with ruthless, uncompromising opponents it is impossble. It is also the only one that is cooperative in nature, and is therefore the only strategy that will allow all sides to come to mutually agreed terms. In today's world, Strategy One is no easier to achieve, but far more appealing than the ever more threatening Strategy Two. Strategy Two could put us all in the ground next to the dinosaurs.
Strategy Two is really all or nothing. Someone will win, and someone will lose. The loser is either exterminated, brainwashed, permanantly repressed, or grudgingly accepts defeat until a later time when they can exact revenge. Most of the time, victory by strategy two is at best bittersweet.
Strategy Three means that one side takes all, screw the other side. Again, someone will win, someone will lose, but the loser does not suffer the total defeat seen in #2. Victory is more a state of mind than a real condition.
Despite its appeal, Israel is seeing the limits to Strategy Three. By building walls and doing little to foster a real negotiating partner in the Palestinian Authority, Israel has strengthened the hand of the mean, uncompromising elements of their opponent at the cost waning numbers of those interested in negotiation. America has been an accomplice, allowing Israel to dictate in no uncertain terms the final status of the Israel-Palestine border while hardly doing anything for the Palestinian Authority. Enabling these elements to prosper by supporting this passive strategy is a maliciously negligent act. Strategy Three does not take the opponent seriously. It makes the opinions of radicals look more reasonable, and justifies the further use of force.
Seeing events unfold as they have, it looks increasingly unlikely that the Palestinian conflict will be settled through disengagement. Like any conflict, they will need to fight it out or talk it out. The lesson of the day: Ignoring the problem doesn't make it go away. Prediction for tomorrow: look for more of the same.
