Hamas and the Mid East

I remember seeing the lights at night, lining the streets of the slum favela hilltops of Rio. Speaking to a friend who had lived there for a number of years, I remarked how incredible it was that such progress had been made in those shanties. He smirked and shot back that it was the drug dealers who had wired the slums. In the same way, most governments are democratic in that people who do not choose to opt out of a situation, either by fleeing or outright revolution, accept the rulership over them.

This acceptance of the ruling powers comes through a crude combination of fear, pride, services, economic activity, common interests and a slew of other socially measurable beliefs and attitudes. Hobbes would have called this acceptance a "contract between the sovereign and his subjects". Weber added that this contract between "rulers and the ruled" could come about through the passive acceptance of the ruled. Often this contract is signed, sealed and delivered long before any person or party wins an election.

In the case of Hamas, it is to the great shock of the world that such an organization should be democratically elected in a free and fair sense. Many on both sides of the divide between Western secularism and Islamofascism see Hamas' overwhelming victory last month as a testament to the murderous strength of terrorists, or the inspiration of freedom fighters, as parlance permits. Hamas' power to place a suicide bomber in the center of Tel Aviv is not some mystery of religious fervor, nor is it an act of pure military strategy. It's the whole package of what a government offers, including a foreign policy. This power took years of civic involvment on the ground in Gaza and the West Bank, providing many of the services that we would expect of government, as well as some we don't. Hamas was powerful long before they won the majority in the Palestinian parlaiment. While the Palestinian Authority steeped itself in the wealth of elitist corruption, squandering foreign aid and peace process negotiation activities under Arafat, Hamas was providing education, health care, jobs and faith to Palestinians. Hamas worked hard to earn the trust of civil society while the PLO was writing press releases out of Cairo and Paris, and gladhanding rich sympathizers. Unfortunately, Hamas was (and is) funded by fascists with a totalitarian mindset bent on destroying Western hegemony.

In my opinion, Sharon was a subscriber to this world view as well. His time in Lebanon would have shown him first hand the power that small movements can wield through providing the basic services that citizenry need. Lebanon was a sea of militias at war with one another, who generated civic support and the ground troops needed to fight for this or that interest. They couldn't have created homegrown mini-armies without creating mini-nations first. In the absence of a responsible government, someone will step in and provide services in exchange for propogating their views of how the world is, and how it should be. First the butter, then the guns. Surely, Sharon's decision to abandon Gaza had many dimensions to it. I think that among those dimensions, Sharon recognized Hamas' power in Gaza and saw an opportunity to split and dismantle the legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority so that there would be no negotiating partner, and Israel could dictate the terms of a final boundry on its own. Originally, I thought he envisioned a civil war breaking out soon after the withdrawl of Israeli forces, making the case that Palestinians did not present a legitimate negotiating partner. Now I think he was subtler than that. All he needed was to allow Palestinians to elect the party that got things done internally to justify and end to negotiations externally. Pulling out of Gaza asserted Hamas' strength and legitimacy as an influence to Israeli policy; something that Fatah hadn't done in years. Sharon put them in power. For peace Sharon wanted an enemy, not a partner. From there, Israel could play by their rules, and not those of the international community.

In the future, we need to look not at the votes that one group or another garner in elections. We need to pay attention to who is really serving people. A nation will elect, or allow to remain in power, anyone who either fulfills a few basic needs, scares the hell out of them, or both. When Fatah ceased to do either, they lost. But they lost long before these elections. Thinking about Macchiavelli's "The Prince" it looks like he grossly underestimated the power of love, especially when, as is the case of Gaza, or Post-Saddam Iraq, the fear of the tyrant is removed. Leaders are almost always elected by people, regardless of whether there's a vote. This lesson should shape further efforts towards democracy anywhere, not just in the mid east.