Double or Something

We're seriously considering sending another 20-40,000 troops to Iraq as a stopgap measure to pacify the place. There's good reason to believe that the psychology at work behind such a proposal may lead towards real biases in decisionmaking. Take this example from Foreign Policy Magazine:

Option A: A sure loss of $890
Option B: A 90 percent chance to lose $1,000 and a 10 percent chance to lose nothing.

"In this situation, a large majority of decision makers will prefer the gamble in Option B, even though the other choice is statistically superior."

If you're going to apply this thinking to our current situation, I think something is missing in this calculus. It's that we're not talking about the difference between $1000 and $890.

First, the currency isn't dollars, it's kids. We're talking about the difference between 3000 soldiers and 4000, or more. Second, we don't know our odds of success. They could be 10%, 50% or whatever. All we have are the opinions of experts, most of whom say that it doesn't look good. Even the players say we'll have to bet more than we're willing to make a difference in this mess we're in.

To leave now (or soon, or something, anything) would mean a sure loss of a war and 3000 lives. As our situation looks ever grimmer, there is a temptation to up the ante, to call and raise, to shoot the moon, whatever cardplaying metaphor you choose, the odds are worse than roulette.

For the same psychological reasons that gambling is so universally popular-- the possiblilty of sweet victory, we are biased towards the unfavorable odds of warfare. Even when we win, it's at a great cost. Even when we have a winning hand, we lose lives in the process. Unlike dollars, lives can never be replaced by the bank.

It looks like this time our leader's poor estimation of risk got us into a sucker's game. Their basic assumptions of the situation, that there was a real threat over there, that we'd be received as heroes were wrong. They mistakened Vietnam for V-E Day... what looked like a slam dunk turned into a bloodbath.

History and psychology show that, right or wrong, in the end war is more often a fool's game than our instincts are likely to predict.

The decision to go to war may turn out to be wise or unwise. History provides examples of both. But for every Second World War, there is a Korea, a Vietnam, a Napoleonic Folly. Sometimes we win, sometimes we lose. But we must make the most impartial calculations possible.

Leave the Texas Holdem poker yokels to TV. Too much is at stake.